By contrast, the contributors to this volume analyze the choice of exchange rate regime and level of central bank independence together; the articles (originally published in a special issue of International Organization) constitute a second generation of research on the determinants of monetary institutions. The contributors consider both economic and political factors to explain a country’s choice of monetary institutions, and examine the effect of political processes in democracies, including interest group pressure, on the balance between economic and distributional policy.

This volume reassesses security cooperation in the region in light of such recent developments as the emergence of new roles for existing institutions, the rise of new institutions, challenges to existing norms of regional interaction, increasing formalization or legalization of regional institutions, the reconstruction of modes of security cooperation that were once seen as mutually exclusive, and the creation of ad hoc and informal security approaches. The book examines how successful these new arrangements have been, whether there is competition among them, and why some modes of security cooperation have proven more feasible than others.

In the nineteenth century, as in the twenty-first, a revolution in transportation and communication did not promote widespread wealth but favored polarization. India, a part of the British empire, was just as poor in 1913 as it was in 1820. Will today’s information economy do better in disseminating wealth than the telegraph did two centuries ago? Presumably yes, if one gauges the outcome from China’s perspective; surely not, if Africa’s experience is a guide. At any rate, poor countries require much effort and investment to become players in the global game. The view that technologies and world trade bring wealth by themselves is no more true today than it was two centuries ago. We should not, Cohen writes, consider globalization as an accomplished fact. It is because of what has yet to happen–the unfulfilled promises of prosperity–that globalization has so many enemies in the contemporary world. For the poorest countries of the world, the problem is not so much that they are exploited by globalization as that they are forgotten and excluded.

To study decision making by the FOMC, the authors have used both formal voting records and detailed transcripts and summaries of deliberations contained in the committee’s Memoranda of Discussion and FOMC Transcripts. The latter sources have been used to construct data sets describing individual committee members’ policy preferences for the 1970-1978 and 1987-1996 periods when the FOMC was chaired by Arthur Burns and Alan Greenspan, respectively. These data are used to estimate monetary policy reaction functions for individual Committee members and to explore the role of majoritarian pressures, pressures for consensus, and the power of the chairman in collective decision making. The rich anecdotal evidence found in the Memoranda of Discussion and FOMC Transcripts inspires the narrative approach taken in two chapters, on the influence of political pressure on FOMC deliberations and on the relevance of the time inconsistency problem for the rise of inflation in the 1970s.

This book offers some of the latest research on computational political economy. The focus is on theoretical models of traditional problems in the field. Each chapter presents an innovative model of interaction between economic agents. Topics include voting behavior, candidate position taking, special interest group contributions, macroeconomic policy making, and corporate decision making.